We study the response of stock prices to monetary policy, distinguishing the effects of exogenous policy actions from "Delphic" actions that reveal the Federal Reserve's macroeconomic forecasts. To decompose composite monetary policy surprises into these separate components, we exploit differences in central bank and private sector forecasts to construct a measure of Federal Reserve private information. Contractionary monetary policy shocks of either type cause a fall in stock prices with exogenous shocks having a larger negative effect. However there is an important asymmetry; when FOMC meetings are unscheduled or when the fed funds rate reverses direction, stock prices actually rise in response to a contractionary Delphic shock.
Introduction
From the early 1980s, the primary tool of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has been to target the federal funds rate. Since the early 1990s, the fed funds rate decision has been accompanied with the release of a corresponding FOMC statement which provides communication about the likely future course of monetary policy.
1 There is an ongoing debate regarding the exact nature of the content that is communicated through the FOMC statements. The conventional view is that the FOMC uses the statement to send signals about the current and future path of interest rates. Recent work (Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016) among others) has suggested that there is an extra "Delphic" dimension, whereby FOMC communication about monetary policy decisions is tied to a signal about their forecast of economic activity. In this paper we aim to shed light on this Delphic component of monetary policy through the lens of the stock market. Specifically, we study how the stock market responds to monetary policy by explicitly separating Delphic policy actions related to revelation of information about economic activity from actions that represent exogenous shocks. We focus on the stock market reaction as it is an important component of the overall monetary policy transmission mechanism, which can drive economic activity by affecting wealth, cost of capital and overall expectations.
We build on the framework of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) (BK henceforth) and use an identification strategy based on high-frequency futures market data. Since stock prices should not react to policy changes that are already anticipated, changes in futures prices that occur in a narrow window around FOMC announcements are used to construct a measure of monetary policy surprise. Given the growing importance of Federal Reserve communication, we extend the federal funds rate based monetary policy surprise used by BK to also include any communication about unexpected future changes in monetary policy. This is done using an extended set of futures data, from the current month up to 4 quarters ahead.
This measure of monetary policy surprise consists of both the traditional notion of an ex-ogenous monetary policy shock and any potential Delphic signal about economic activity. We take the view that FOMC signals about economic activity should surprise the market if they reveal any asymmetric information that the Federal Reserve possesses. This does not require taking a stand on whether the Federal Reserve actually has superior information relative to the market (à la Romer and Romer (2000) ). To capture this asymmetric information we construct a measure of private information that combines market survey data with the Federal Reserve's internal forecasts. Specifically, our measure is defined as the difference between the Greenbook forecasts produced by the Federal Reserve Board's staff and the consensus forecast from the market based Blue Chip survey. Our estimation methodology proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we regress the monetary policy surprise on our measure of private information. The estimates suggest that when the Greenbook forecast is more optimistic relative to the market's forecast, it is related to a positive monetary policy surprise (i.e. a contractionary surprise). The fitted value from this regression is the Delphic component of the policy surprise while the residual is a clean measure of an exogenous monetary policy shock. In the second step we regress the stock return in a narrow window around the FOMC announcement on the Delphic shock and the exogenous shock.
We layout a simple conceptual framework to understand how exogenous and Delphic shocks can affect stock prices differently. Under some simple conditions, the stock response to an exogenous shock is expected to be negative, while that of the Delphic shock can be either positive or negative. Our baseline results using data from 1991 to 2010 find a stock response to the exogenous shock that is similar to BK. A hypothetical surprise increase of 25 basis points in the expected 1 year ahead fed funds rate results in about a 1.45% fall in the S&P 500 index. On the other hand, a contractionary Delphic shock of the same size reduces stock prices by about 0.50%; a statistically significant difference relative to the exogenous shock response. Thus, on average stock prices fall in response to surprise contractionary shocks, whether they are exogenous or Delphic in nature. But we find that there is an important asymmetry in the stock response on certain specific FOMC meetings, especially concerning Delphic shocks. These episodes occur when FOMC policy actions were enacted at unscheduled dates (also called inter-meeting moves)
or when there is a reversal in the direction of the change in the fed funds rate target (also called turning points). On these particular FOMC meetings, the stock market falls more in response to a contractionary exogenous shock but actually rises in response to a contractionary Delphic shock.
To complement our high-frequency analysis, we use a monthly vector autoregression based decomposition of stock prices using the framework of Campbell and Ammer (1993) . This methodology breaks down current excess stock returns into revision of the expectation of discounted future dividends, the real interest rate, and future excess returns. We find that on average the response of excess returns to exogenous shocks is mostly due to changes in expected future excess returns and dividends, while the excess return response to a Delphic shock is primarily attributed to changes in expected dividends. These vector autoregression results confirm the asymmetric effects of monetary policy actions (especially the Delphic shocks) on unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings. The stock response to Delphic shocks on these meetings appears to be driven mostly by movements in the expected future excess returns.
This paper lies at the intersection of two distinct strands of the literature. First, there is a long line of work that studies the effect of monetary policy on stock prices, building on the seminal work of BK. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) and more recently Kurov (2012) expand on this work by separately estimating the stock response to surprises to the federal funds rate and surprises in forward guidance. There has also been work exploring the cross-sectional firm level stock price reactions to monetary policy. See Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) , Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2013) among others. Finally, while our analysis focuses exclusively on a narrow window around FOMC meetings, there is intriguing new evidence that discusses other occasions on which the Federal Reserve communicates to the public (for example in speeches made by FOMC members). These are explored in more detail by Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015) , Lucca and Moench (2015) and Neuhierl and Weber (2016) . However, all these papers use the composite monetary policy surprise measure, while the focus of our paper is to separate the effect of Delphic monetary shocks from the exogenous shocks.
Second, this paper is also related to the growing literature on how central bank signals about fundamentals can affect economic activity. Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2015) empirically highlight the role of Delphic signals and their effect on survey expectations. Melosi (2015) and Tang (2015) provide a more structural perspective on the signaling channel of monetary policy. Based on the work of Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) among others, unscheduled FOMC meetings are thought to be more likely to reflect new information about the economy. The stock market response results in this paper are consistent with this interpretation. In light of the growing evidence of the signaling channel of monetary policy, we advocate accounting for the asymmetric effects on these meetings to get the full picture of the monetary transmission mechansim.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we layout a conceptual framework to understand how monetary policy actions can affect the stock market, with a focus on the role of private information. In section 3 we detail the construction of the monetary policy surprise and our measure of Federal Reserve private information. Section 4 provides the main results and some concluding remarks are presented in section 5.
Stock Prices and Monetary Policy
To identify the effect of monetary policy on stock prices, one cannot directly regress stock prices on the central bank's policy instrument (for example the short-term interest rate). The endogenous reaction of both stock prices and the central bank's policy instrument to common economic conditions leads to the classic simultaneous equation bias. Thus the literature has tried to isolate exogenous variation in the policy instrument to overcome this problem. Following the work of BK, an important strategy involves high-frequency identification using federal funds futures contracts. In this section we first outline a simple framework to understand futures based identification, with a special emphasis on why central bank private information can matter. This treatment is closely related to the framework laid out in Miranda-Agrippino (2016 
where i t+h|t = E t i t+h is the expected fed funds rate at t + h and ζ
is the risk-premium. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the relevance of risk-premia in fed funds futures markets, but they are not crucial to our analysis and we will set them to zero in the illustrative model.
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The next step is to consider a general monetary policy rule where the central bank changes the short-term interest rate i t in response to current, lagged and forecasts of certain indicators of economic activity.
where e t represents a monetary policy shock and g(.) is the central bank's reaction function.
Ω CB t|t contains the central bank information set available at time t, including any current information that is used to form forecasts. The hat denotes that not all economic data is available contemporaneously and must be estimated.
An important convention in the monetary policy literature is that e t is assumed to be an exogenous shock, i.e. it is unrelated to economic activity. Thus if we can estimate e t , then we can regress stock prices on e t to identify the effects of monetary policy. One strategy for identification is to study changes in fed funds futures data around FOMC announcements, following BK.
2 Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) find that fed funds futures risk-premia are slow-moving and do not change much around FOMC announcements. On the other hand, Miranda-Agrippino (2016) finds a bigger role for risk-premia.
Consider the futures contract maturing at the end of the current month (i.e. h = 0). Specifically, consider the futures prices of this contract measured just before the FOMC announcement
The M superscript denotes the fact that the futures price will reflect expectations based on the market's information set, Ω M t|t 3 . The key assumption in the futures based identification is that no other macro news announcements are released in the window between t − ε and t. Thus we have that Ω t|t−ε = Ω t|t . Now consider the futures price after the FOMC announcement.
Note that the information set that is relevant to the short rate set by the central bank is its own information set. The monetary policy surprise is measured as the change in the futures contract
where the last equality holds if we assume a linear reaction function g(.) for the central bank.
More generally, we can show that the analysis used to derive the last equation also applies to futures contracts that expire not in the current month, but in the future. These surprises likewise capture an exogenous component, which is a signal about shocks to the interest rate that are expected to occur in the future. But the surprises also capture a signal about future shocks to the interest rate that are related to central bank private information about macroeconomic fundamentals (i.e the Delphic shocks). 
Using this equation we construct the residual e t and the fitted value γ Ω CB t|t − Ω M t|t . In the next step of the estimation procedure we regress the change in the stock price on the residual and fitted value.
where S t is the stock price and ∆ represents the change in a narrow window around the FOMC announcement. What should we expect for the sign of the two coefficients β 1 and β 2 ? Next we layout a simple "model-free" theoretical framework that can help us understand the related issues. If the rise in interest rates has a contractionary effect on the economy, it will mean bad news about future cash flows. However this decision to increase interest rates could be driven by the central bank's forecast being more optimistic relative to the market. This Delphic signal could lead the market to revise their expectations of economic activity upwards in response. This upward revision of expectations will mean good news about future cash flows. Regarding discount rates, the conventional wisdom is that these rates should rise with a contractionary policy shock.
But if the Delphic shock affects the risk premium then this effect could be counteracted. Overall there is not much theoretical work that analyzes the effect of Delphic shocks. Thus we are not confident in assessing the sign of the impact of this shock on discount rates as well.
Next we flesh out this intuition in a little more detail. Consider the stock price S t that depends on the discount rate r t (composed of a risk-free rate and an equity premium) and news about future cash flows X t (adopting the convention that an increase in X t represents positive news about cash flows ) < 0. The total response of the stock market to an exogenous shock is the sum of two negative components and thus we should expect β 1 in our regression from equation 4.2 to be negative.
Next consider the response of stock prices to a Delphic shock.
As discussed above, ? In conventional models of monetary policy, the typical assumption is that there is no asymmetric information and thus g t is always zero. In a setting with asymmetric information a positive value for g t can have two effects. It does reflect an increase in the Fed's policy instrument and could thus translate into a contractionary effect on the economy, i.e. bad news about expected future cash flows. However, there is some recent empirical work suggesting that central bank signals can directly affect private sector beliefs about future economic activity. Melosi (2015) builds a model with an explicit signaling channel of monetary policy. The model incorporates a mechanism that could lead agents to expect higher inflation in response to a signal tied to an increase in the interest rate. In a similar vein, Nakamura and Steinsson (2015) sketch a model where the central bank can affect the market's expectations about the natural rate of interest. In their model an increase in interest rate can cause the market to revise upwards their expectation of the natural rate, leading to a rise in economic activity. Finally, in a recent paper Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016) use similarly constructed private information variables and show that the component of the monetary policy surprises that is related to optimistic Fed private information predicts upward revisions of economy activity by forecasters. All these studies suggest that To summarize, the conceptual framework suggests that we should have a strong prior for β 1 to be negative but there is more uncertainty about the sign of β 2 as it can reasonably be expected to be either positive or negative.
Data
We use the S&P 500 index to measure the response of the stock market. The prices are measured in a 30 minute window around FOMC announcements, starting at 10 minutes before the announcement and ending 20 minutes after the announcement. For our baseline results, we use the sample period 1991-2010. There are 180 total FOMC policy decisions over this time frame. We drop a total of four data points. We exclude 8/17/2007 and 11/25/2008 due to stock market data unavailability for those dates. We also drop 9/17/2001 and 3/18/2009 following Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016) . This leaves 176 observations in our sample. In the next subsection we detail the construction of the monetary policy surprise and conclude this section by discussing the private information variables constructed from Greenbook and Blue Chip forecasts.
Monetary policy surprise
Our measure of the surprise change in monetary policy is constructed from interest rate futures contracts, as in Kuttner (2001) . Federal funds rate and Eurodollar futures contracts capture the market's expectations about future Federal Reserve actions. Changes in these futures contracts around FOMC announcements therefore serve as a measure of the change in policy that is unanticipated by the market. Since any expected change in policy will already be priced into financial assets, the reaction of asset prices to monetary policy should be entirely due to this surprise component.
We want the monetary policy surprise measure to capture surprises to expectations about future fed funds rate changes, in addition to any surprise to the current month's fed funds rate target. Thus to construct our measure of the monetary policy surprise, we follow Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) and use five futures contracts: the current month's fed funds futures, the 3-month ahead fed funds futures, and the 2-quarter, 3-quarter, and 4-quarter ahead Eurodol-lar futures.
4 For the baseline results, the surprise in each contract is measured as the change in the futures rate in a 30 minute window (10 minutes before to 20 minutes after) around FOMC policy decisions as in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) . But we also discuss results obtained using a broader daily window. Taken together, the five contracts contain rich information about the short and medium term path of expected interest rates.
To summarize this information in a parsimonious way we perform a principal components analysis. Let X denote a T x 5 matrix of the change in the price of the 5 futures contracts, where
T is the number of FOMC meetings. We can then perform a principal components analysis of the futures price changes
where F are factors, Λ are factor loadings, and η is an error term. The first principal component of F explains more than 80% of the total variation across all the contracts. 5 We therefore use this first principal component as our baseline measure of monetary policy surprises.
6 Figure 1 plots this monetary policy surprise measure using both the 30 minute and daily window. The two series display a high degree of correlation with some minor discrepancies around the financial crisis in 2008 and in the early 1990s. To facilitate interpretation of our results below, we normalize the policy surprise such that its effect on the four quarter ahead Eurodollar futures contract is equal to unity. Thus the coefficient from a regression of stocks on the monetary policy surprise will measure the effect on the stock market of a 1% surprise rise in the fed funds rate that is expected 4 quarters from now.
Federal Reserve Private Information Our measure of Federal Reserve private in-
formation is constructed using the FOMC Greenbook forecasts and the private sector Blue Chip forecasts, and is similar to the approach used in Barakchian and Crowe (2013) and Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016 Each set of forecasts predicts the values of macroeconomic variables on a quarterly basis. For the 1991-2010 sample we use the following four variables: real GDP, CPI, industrial production, and the civilian unemployment rate. For each variable, both set of forecasts contain at least five different forecast horizons: the current quarter forecast, the quarter ahead forecast, two quarter ahead forecast, three quarter ahead forecast, and four quarter ahead forecast. Our measure of private information for variable i at forecast horizon j is:
These variables are plotted in figure 2. A few interesting points stand out. These variables are persistent and for each variable as the forecast horizon increases, the persistence rises. This suggests that the Federal Reserve's internal forecasts are not completely inferred by the market based on FOMC meeting actions and announcements. This is especially true for the longerhorizon forecasts. For a given variable, in addition to the autocorrelation for each individual forecast horizon, the forecasts for different horizons are also correlated with one another. Forecast horizons that are "closer" to each other are more highly correlated. For example, the 4 quarter ahead forecast is quite highly correlated with the 3 quarter ahead forecast but not with the nowcast.
These patterns guide us in choosing the private information measures that will be used in the regression analysis below. First, given the high cross-correlation among forecasts of different horizons (for a given variable) we use only the nowcast and the 4 quarter ahead forecast. Next, given the high persistence of the private information variables, we include the first lag in our regression. Thus our baseline specification will have the contemporaneous and first lag of the nowcast (0 quarter ahead forecast) and 4 quarter ahead forecast for four macro variables: GDP, CPI, Industrial Production and Unemployment. Thus we have a total of 16 private information variables that capture the relevant information. A potential alternative is to follow the approach of Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016) and construct a short and long factor for each variable using principal component analysis. We found that the short factor and long factors correlate very highly with the nowcast and the 4 quarter ahead forecasts.
Results

Stock prices and monetary policy surprise
We start by exploring the relationship between changes in the S&P 500 index (∆S t ) and our measure of monetary policy surprise (mps t ) detailed in the previous section. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for these two measures using both a tight window and broad window around FOMC announcements. The tight window measures the change from 10 minute before to 20 minutes after the announcement. The broad window is just the daily change. The correlation between the tight and broad measures of the monetary policy surprise is high (0.81), while the correlation is lower for stock returns (0.53).
For the policy surprise, moving to a broader window increases the standard deviation slightly, but it does so considerably more for the stock return. Thus stock returns in the broad window appear to have more noise relative to the tight window. The table also provides information separated by unscheduled FOMC meetings and meetings that correspond to "turning points" ( which are instances when the federal funds rate target is changed in the direction opposite to previous changes). The specific dates for the unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings are listed in table 1. There has been some discussion in the literature that FOMC meetings of these two types are "unusual" relative to the other meetings. BK document that stock price reactions are much larger on turning point FOMC meetings. Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) find that monetary policy surprises on unscheduled FOMC meetings are more likely to reveal information about the state of the economy, i.e. suggesting a role for Delphic shocks (using our terminology).
We will discuss the importance of these particular episodes for stock prices in more detail below and in section 4.3. For now, we want to point out that both these papers use data up to the early 2000s (2002 for BK and 2003 for Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004 ). Extending the data up to 2010, we notice that both monetary policy surprises and stock returns are substantially more volatile on unscheduled and turning point days, consistent with the idea that these meetings are somewhat different. Taken together, it is an indication that stock returns in the broad window have a lot more noise relative to the tight window. The underlying identifying assumption in this paper is that the relevant window around FOMC announcements does not contain any other important macroeconomic news event. In light of the above results, this identifying assumption is more credible with the tight window and motivates us to use the tight window for our benchmark results below in section 4.3. This is also consistent with the recommendation of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) among others. To conclude this section, figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the stock return and the monetary policy surprise in the tight 30 minute window (which is our preferred measure that is used in the results below). There is a clear negative relationship.
The black triangles mark the Unscheduled FOMC meetings while the red squares represent turning points, highlighting that the bigger monetary policy surprises occur at these two types of meetings. Table 5 shows the results from this regression using the nowcast and 4 quarter ahead forecasts for the GDP, CPI, Unemployment and Industrial Production private information variables. Given the persistent nature of the private information variables, we also include the first lag. The pvalue jointly tests the null hypothesis that the private information variables have no explanatory power. This is rejected at the 1% level. The R 2 from the regression is 0.17, which is substantial but also highlights the fact that a major part of the monetary policy surprise is exogenous with respect to the Fed's private information.
In the theoretical motivation sketched out in section 2.2, we emphasized that the response of stock prices to private information depends on how forecast differences are related to interest rate changes. The regression coefficients from 
Stock Price Response to Exogenous and Delphic Shocks
Now we are ready to run our second step regression. We regress the change in the S&P 500 index in the 30 minute window on the exogenous and Delphic shocks obtained from the first step discussed above. The estimating equation is
Since the regressors in this second step are generated in the first step, we have to account for the added sampling uncertainty. This is done by bootstrapping the standard errors. The key idea is to conduct the resampling at the beginning and thus to perform both steps of the two-step regression procedure for every bootstrap sample. We use 10, 000 replications in the bootstrap procedure.
The results are presented in table 7 with the bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
Column 1 shows that the exogenous shock has a negative and significant effect on stock returns with a slightly larger magnitude than the monetary policy surprise. Specifically, a 1% surprise rise in the fed funds rate that is expected 4 quarters from now, results in a precisely estimated 5.8% fall in stock prices (relative to the 5.2% fall for the monetary policy surprise). 8 The effect of the Delphic shock is also negative but much lower at -1.9%. While this coefficient by itself is not statistically significant, it is significantly different from the coefficient on the exogenous shock (with a p-value for the difference of 0.043). As shown in table 6, exogenous shocks are more volatile than Delphic shocks and we reinterpret the coefficients to get a better gauge of the size of the effects. Specifically, stock prices fall 0.35% and .05% in response to a one standard deviation exogenous and Delphic shock respectively. An important implication is that on average surprise Next we check the robustness of the results to sample selection. First, we consider the zero lower bound episode. Since late 2008, the fed funds rate has been stuck around zero and all the variation in our monetary policy surprise measure is driven by forward guidance surprises rather than any target rate change surprise. To check whether our results our driven by this, we rerun our estimation excluding the zero lower bound episode. The first two columns of table 8 present these results. Column 1a shows that the overall response to exogenous shocks and Delphic shocks is similar to the baseline case reported in table 7, with similar standard errors as well. The interaction terms with the unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings also paint a similar picture. Relative to the baseline results, on these particular FOMC meetings, the stock response to exogenous shocks is slightly more negative and the response to Delphic shocks is slightly less positive. For the interaction coefficients we find that the sign of the responses is similar to the baseline case. The magnitude of the effects is a little larger for the exogenous shock and a little smaller for the Delphic shock on these particular FOMC meetings. However, the standard errors are somewhat larger in this case.
Finally, we control for the employment report when running our regressions. Recall that the underlying identifying assumption is that no other important macroeconomic event or announcement is occurring in the relevant window around the FOMC announcement. However, as pointed out by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) there are a handful of FOMC meetings that coincide with macro news releases. Specifically, in the early 1990s there are 7 FOMC meetings that occur on the same day as the release of the employment report. Of special concern are 5 of these meetings that are unscheduled because if the Federal Reserve and the stock market are both responding to the employment report then our estimates will be mistakenly picking up that relationship. As discussed above, in constructing the the stock price change and monetary policy surprises the narrow 30 minute window was preferred precisely to avoid this particular issue. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) show that using the narrow 30 minute window does indeed help in circumventing this identification issue. Here we confirm that our main results are not affected by excluding the 7 FOMC meetings that coincide with the employment report.
Column 3a of table 8 shows that the coefficients on the exogenous and Delphic shocks are very similar to the baseline results in table 7. Column 3b shows that on the unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings, the stock price response is in the same direction as the baseline results with the p-value on the interaction term for the exogenous shock and the Delphic shock being 0.043 and 0.02 respectively. Excluding the employment report in fact makes the magnitude of these effects a little larger.
Overall, we conclude that our results are robust to sample selection. Next we use a VAR based decomposition to further understand the stock price response.
VAR Based Decomposition
In section 2.2 we discussed a broad but abstract theoretical framework where stock price movements can be broadly attributed to two main components: i) news about discount rates and ii) news about dividends (or cash flow news). In this section we use a more concrete decomposition of stock prices based on the work of Campbell and Shiller (1988) . The main goal is to understand the importance of these two components in driving the stock market responses to monetary policy. The exact methodology used here follows the work of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Campbell and Ammer (1993) .
The key idea is to decompose the current period's unexpected excess returns (e 
ρ is the steady state level of the price to dividend ratio and is set to .9962 following BK. The expectations terms in 4.4 need to be estimated to evaluate the decomposition in equation 4.3.
A vector autoregression is used to construct these expectations. Campbell and Ammer (1993) show how this relationship can be modeled using the variables of interest and any other variables that might be helpful in forecasting excess returns. The resulting model is a six variable VAR with one lag.
The endogenous variables (z t ) include the excess stock return, real interest rate, relative 3-month T-bill rate, change in the 3-month T-bill rate, the dividend-price ratio, and the spread between Thus we do not want to place too much emphasis on how our results compare to BK because of the differences in the sample dates and how the monetary policy surprises are constructed.
Rather, the main purpose of the analysis in this section is to compare how the decomposition varies between the exogenous and Delphic shocks. We can more reasonably expect that the shortcomings of this residual based decomposition are not systematically related to the manner in which we construct the exogenous and Delphic shocks. Thus our emphasis will be on the difference in the decomposition between the exogenous shock and Delphic shock rather than on the level of the effects themselves.
In this framework, a natural way to evaluate the effect of monetary policy is to include the exogenous and Delphic shock directly in the VAR. Denoting the estimated exogenous shock by e t and the estimated Delpic shock
by g t we get
The VAR is estimated at a monthly frequency which requires aggregating the monetary policy shocks from the FOMC meeting frequency to a monthly frequency. We follow a simple rule of summing up any monetary policy shocks in a given month to get the monthly number. Having estimated the VAR, we want to calculate the effect of the two monetary policy shocks on the discounted sums in equation 4.4. We can use the relationship outlined above in equation 4.5 together with the orthogonality of the monetary policy shocks. For example, consider the equation for the real interest rate e r t+1 = s r (I − ρA) −1 w t+1 = s r (I − ρA) −1 (φ 1 e t + φ 2 g t + w t ) (4.8)
From this equation the effect of the exogenous shock on the present value of current and expected future real rates is given by
and the effect of the Delphic shock on the present value of current and expected future real rates is given by
The response of the present value of current and expected future excess returns and dividends is calculated in a similar way. To account for the parameter uncertainty of the VAR coefficients in A, standard errors are calculated using the delta method following Campbell and Ammer (1993) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) . Table 10 shows the response of the discounted sums to i) the composite monetary policy surprise, ii) the exogenous shock and iii) the Delphic shock. . Relative to BK, the monetary policy surprise has a larger effect on current excess equity return. Note this is not surprising as our monetary policy surprise measure contains forward guidance surprises in addition to the federal funds rate surprises used in BK.
However as found in BK, the current excess return is explained mostly by discounted sums of dividends and future excess returns.
Relative to the composite monetary policy surprise, the exogenous shock (shown in the third column) has a very similar effect on current excess returns. The size of the impact is slightly larger (-17.6 vs. -16.0), which is consistent with the regressions from section 4.3. This larger negative response is driven mostly by a larger positive response of future excess returns (4.6 vs 3.5). The response to the Delphic shock are quite different, although the standard errors are substantially larger. The overall effect on current excess returns is smaller at -7.7 The most interesting aspect is the composition of this response. The share of the dividend response is much bigger at -9.02, accounting for 117% of the total effect on current excess returns (relative to 66% for the exogenous shock). This large response of dividends is counteracted by a negative response of future excess returns. This response is in contrast to that of BK's federal funds rate surprise, the composite monetary policy surprise and the exogenous monetary policy shock. For each of these three expected future excess returns rise.
Next we extend the above analysis to account for the differential effects on unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings. This can be done in a straightforward manner using the framework of equation 4.7. Denote the unscheduled and turning point dummy by D t .
Using this equation the effect on the various components can be calculated as above. For example, on unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings the effect of the exogenous shock on the present value of current and expected future real rates is given by
and the effect of the Delphic shock is given by s r (I − ρA) −1 φ 2 + φ 5 (4.13) Table 11 shows theses estimates. The response of current excess returns and its components to the exogenous shock ( φ 1 ) is similar to that reported in table 10. The interaction effects of exogenous shocks ( φ 4 ) are small as well. The overall response of current excess returns to a Delphic shock is more negative once we allow for the interaction (-16.62 vs. -7.73 ). This larger negative response on regular FOMC days is counteracted by a large positive response on unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings. Specifically the total effect on these meetings ( φ 2 + φ 5 = 17.04) is roughly the same size as the baseline effect but with the opposite sign. This positive response is mainly driven by a large fall in the future excess return and to a lesser extent by a rise in dividends in response to contractionary Delphic shocks. The VAR decomposition exercise confirms that the stock market responds very differently to Delphic shocks that occur on unscheduled or turning point FOMC meetings. Moreover, the results point to a change in the risk premium as a major driver of this asymmetric response. 11 In recent work Hanson and Stein (2015) and Gertler and Karadi (2015) find that monetary policy shocks have substantial effects on bond interest rate term premia. Our results show that, at least on certain FOMC dates, the stock risk premium also seems to respond to monetary policy shocks. We view our results as providing complementary evidence to this active area of research.
Conclusion
What are the effects of FOMC announcements on the economy? In this paper we aim to shed light on this question by studying the response of stock prices. By exploiting differences in central bank and private sector forecasts we construct a measure of Federal Reserve private information. We use this measure to separate monetary policy surprises into exogenous and Delphic shocks. Exogenous shocks are surprise changes in monetary policy which are unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals whereas Delphic shocks are surprise changes in policy attributable to the Fed's asymmetric information about the state of the economy.
We find that, on average, stock prices fall more in response to exogenous shocks relative to 16-May-00 11-May-00 10-May-00 9-Aug-05 4-Aug-05 10-Jul-05 14-Dec-10 8-Dec-10 10-Dec-10 Table 7 : The table reports the regression of the change in the S&P 500 index on the residual and fitted value of the policy surprise from the first step, both measured in a 30 minute window around FOMC announcements. The Unscheduled dummy is set to 1 for FOMC meetings occurring outside the regularly scheduled dates. The Turning Point dummy is set to 1 if the policy decision changed the fed funds rate in the opposite direction of the previous change. The Unscheduled/Turning Point dummy is set to 1 for either occurrence. Bootstrapped standard errors are in the parentheses. Table 8 : The table reports the regression of the change in the S&P 500 index on the residual and fitted value of the policy surprise from the first step, both measured in a 30 minute window around FOMC announcements. The Unscheduled dummy is set to 1 for FOMC meetings occurring outside the regularly scheduled dates. The Turning Point dummy is set to 1 if the policy decision changed the fed funds rate in the opposite direction of the previous change. The Unscheduled/Turning Point dummy is set to 1 for either occurrence. Bootstrapped standard errors are in the parentheses.
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